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Abstract
The aim of this article is to investigate the relationship between environmental
stringency and intra–European Union (EU) trade flows. Two main hypotheses are
tested. First, we test whether the stringency of a country’s environmental regulations
may result in pollution havens. Second, we test whether the results differ by industry
and by the EU membership tenure (EU-15 vs. the newly added Central East European
Countries). An augmented gravity model is estimated using panel data for 21 coun-
tries during the period from 1999 to 2013 for the full sample and also separately for
the Central East European Countries and the EU-15 members. Our results show
weak support for the pollution haven hypothesis for some dirty industries, mainly for
net exports from western EU countries to the rest. Instead, support for the ‘‘Porter
hypothesis’’ is found for trade in clean goods.
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pollution haven hypothesis, Porter hypothesis, European Union, trade flows
The so-called pollution haven hypothesis (PHH) predicts that trade liberaliza-
tion will cause pollution-intensive industries to migrate from countries with
stringent environmental regulations to countries with lax environmental
regulations. The latter countries may have a comparative advantage in dirty
goods and consequently attract foreign investment in their polluting sectors.1
Whether such pollution haven eﬀects (PHE) exist is of great importance in the
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present policy debates, since the existence of such eﬀects could be a potential
problem in negotiating integration agreements. In this sense, and concerning the
most recent European Union (EU) enlargement, worries have been raised that
the Central East European Countries (CEECs) could become pollution havens
for dirty industries in Europe. This represents a concern particularly if the
CEECs continue with policies of softer environmental regulations.
To the best of our knowledge, Jug and Mirza (2005) are the ﬁrst authors who
investigate the PHE in the European continent. They use a structural gravity
equation and employ environmental expenditure data as the environmental
stringency variable. They also follow the recent literature and argue that
environmental regulations and trade are endogenous to each other. Since their
investigation covers a brief time (e.g., 1996–1999), it cannot evaluate whether
there has been a change in the interaction between trade ﬂows and environmen-
tal regulation following the recent accession of CEECs into the EU in 2004 and
2007.
Using data from 1999 to 2013, our article aims to investigate the relationship
between environmental stringency and export ﬂows in the EU in order to
determine whether the recent accessions of the CEECs into the EU and the
subsequent changes in the regulatory framework of new members have aﬀected
intra-EU trade ﬂows.
We test two main hypotheses. First, we test whether the stringency of a
country’s environmental regulations results in pollution havens or, on the con-
trary, it results in better export performance. Second, we test whether the results
diﬀer by industry (dirty vs. clean) and by the EU membership tenure (EU-15 vs.
newly added EU member countries in 2004 and 2007). The question of whether
more stringent environmental regulations harm or foster trade is relevant to the
current debate regarding the PHH and its focus on the EU enlargement. The
later has not yet been studied using disaggregated trade data and distinguishing
between trade in dirty goods and trade in clean goods.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows; The following section
presents the underlying theories and the related empirical studies on the rela-
tionship between trade and the environment. The third section outlines the the-
oretical assumptions behind the gravity model of trade, describes the data and
the variables used, as well as our empirical strategy. The fourth section presents
the main results, and the ﬁnal section provides our conlcusions.
Literature Review: The Trade and the
Environment Debate
There is a close and complex relationship between trade and the environment,
and the eﬀects of trade liberalization on the environment are rather mixed. This
observation has led scholars to typically decompose the environmental impact
of trade liberalization into the scale, technique, and composition eﬀects
2 Journal of Environment & Development 0(0)
 at SUB Goettingen on November 30, 2016jed.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
(Antweiler, Copeland, & Taylor, 2001; Cole & Elliott 2003; Grossman &
Krueger, 1991; Lopez & Islam, 2008; Stoessel, 2001). Furthermore, when
trade is liberalized, all three eﬀects work in tandem. The scale eﬀect implies
that holding the composition of trade and the production techniques constant,
an increase in the scale of global economic activity due, in part, to international
trade, leads to an increase in the total amount of pollution. Thus, trade liberal-
ization has a negative impact on the environment. However, trade and growth
are also credited with raising national incomes, and higher incomes cause citi-
zens to demand high levels of environmental quality. Stricter environmental
regulations provide incentives for ﬁrms to shift production toward cleaner
goods. There is a great deal of evidence that higher incomes aﬀect environmental
quality in positive ways (Copeland & Taylor, 2004; Grossman & Krueger, 1991).
This suggests that when assessing the eﬀects of growth and trade on the envir-
onment, we cannot automatically hold trade responsible for environmental
damage (Copeland & Taylor, 2004). Since beneﬁcial changes in environmental
policy are likely to follow, the net impact on the environment remains unclear.
The technique eﬀect predicts that changes in the production methods induced
by trade liberalization have a positive impact on the environment. Researchers
widely agree that trade is responsible for technology transfers. New technology
is thought to beneﬁt the environment if pollution per unit of output is reduced.
Furthermore, if the scale of the economy and the mix of goods produced are
held constant, a reduction in the emission intensity results in a decline in
pollution.
According to the composition eﬀect, trade liberalization will result in a
country specializing in producing and trading goods in which it has a compara-
tive advantage. The impact of the composition eﬀect on the environment is not
straightforward, and it depends on whether the source of a country’s compara-
tive advantage lies in a country’s endowment of capital or labor or the stringency
of environmental regulation. Four theoretical hypotheses have emerged con-
cerning the nature of the composition eﬀect associated with trade liberalization
that led to diﬀerent expectations.
First, the PHH states that diﬀerences in environmental regulations are the
main motivation for trade. The hypothesis predicts that trade liberalization in
goods will lead to a relocation of pollution intensive production from countries
with high income and tight environmental regulations to countries with low
income and lax environmental regulations. Developing countries, therefore,
will have a comparative advantage in pollution intensive industries and
become pollution havens. In this scenario, developed countries will gain, mean-
ing that they will have a clean environment, while developing countries will lose,
meaning that they will have a polluted environment).
Early empirical papers suggested that the stringency of environmental regu-
lations had little or no impact on trade patterns (Grossman & Krueger, 1991;
Tobey, 1990; Xu, 2000). The argument was that, in general, pollution costs are
Martı´nez-Zarzoso et al. 3
 at SUB Goettingen on November 30, 2016jed.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
relatively small with respect to total costs and multinational ﬁrms that operate in
developed and developing countries do not want to be seen as transferring dirty
operations to the latter countries. However, some studies have found weak evi-
dence in support of PHH (Grether & de Melo, 2003; Jug & Mirza, 2005; Khan &
Yoshino, 2004; Mantovani & Vancauteren, 2008). This ﬁnding coupled with
additional sources of comparative advantages, such as labor costs diﬀerences,
provides an extra reason to transfer production from rich to poor countries.
Cole (2004) provided an excellent literature review and presents empirical evi-
dence consistent with this view. Although we restrict our literature review to
studies that examine the eﬀects of environmental standards on trade ﬂows,
recent studies that examined the eﬀect of regulations on foreign direct invest-
ment ﬂows (see Ben Khedra and Zugravu, 2012; Dean, Lovely, & Wang, 2009;
Rezza, 2013; Wagner & Timmins, 2009), or on the carbon leakage content of
import ﬂows (Aichele & Felbermayr, 2012) found empirical support for the
PHH. More recently, using data on the U.S. regulation and trade with
Canada and Mexico, Levinson and Taylor (2008) showed that pollution control
expenditures have important eﬀects on trade ﬂows. They suggest that aggrega-
tion issues, unobserved heterogeneity, country heterogeneity, and endogeneity
can bias the results against ﬁnding support for the PHH. With respect to aggre-
gation, Grether and de Melo (2003) and Mathys (2002) noted that an aggregate
analysis hides speciﬁc patterns in each industry and hence may mask PHE in
speciﬁc industries. They argue that if there is indeed a PHH story in the data, it is
more likely to be found at the disaggregated level. Similarly, Ederington,
Levinson, and Minier (2005) identiﬁed and tested three explanations that
account for the lack of evidence for the PHH. These reasons are that (a) most
trade takes place between developed countries; (b) some industries are less geo-
graphically footloose2 than others and, therefore, least likely mobile; and (c) for
the majority of industries environmental regulation costs represent only a small
fraction of total production costs. In all three cases, aggregated trade ﬂows
across multiple countries could conceal the eﬀect of environmental regulation
on trade for countries with distinct patterns of regulation, as well as for more
footloose industries or for industries where environmental expenditures are sig-
niﬁcant. The authors ﬁnd support for the ﬁrst two explanations. On one hand,
estimating the average eﬀect of an increase in environmental costs over all
industries understates the eﬀect of regulatory diﬀerences on trade in more foot-
loose industries and on trade with low-income countries. On the other hand, a
study that uses disaggregated data might be problematic. For example, most
cross-industry studies only examine dirty industry sectors (e.g., Tobey, 1990).
Those industries could share some unobservable characteristics (e.g., natural
resource intensiveness) that also make them immobile. Restricting the sample
to pollution-intensive industries might lead to the selection of the least geograph-
ically footloose industries. For this reason, it is reasonable to examine the trade
in clean sectors as well for a comparison because we would expect a diﬀerent
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eﬀect of pollution regulations on pollution-intensive sectors (or even to have the
opposite sign) than on clean sectors (Brunnermeier & Levinson, 2004).
Unobserved heterogeneity refers to unobserved industry or country char-
acteristics, which are likely to be correlated with strict regulations and the
production and export of pollution-intensive goods. Assume that a country
has an unobserved comparative advantage in the production of a pollution-
intensive good; consequently, it will export a lot of that good and will also
generate a lot of pollution. Ceteris paribus, it will impose strict regulations to
control pollution output. If these unobserved variables are omitted in a
simple cross-sectional model, this will produce inconsistent results, which
cannot be meaningfully interpreted (in this example, a simple cross-sectional
model would ﬁnd a positive relationship between strict regulations and
exports). The easiest solution to this problem would be to use panel data,
with time variation, and incorporate country or industry-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects
(Brunnermeier & Levinson, 2004).
In addition, pollution regulations and trade may be endogenous to each
other, that is, the causality might run in both directions (problem of simultan-
eous causality). If trade liberalization leads to higher income which in turn
causes an increase in the demand for environmental quality, then environmental
regulations may be a function of trade. A possible solution to this problem is to
use instrumental variables techniques. However, the instruments should possess
the following characteristics: vary over time and be correlated with the measure
of environmental stringency but not with the error term (Brunnermeier &
Levinson, 2004).
The second hypothesis is the factor endowment hypothesis that claims that
trade patterns are determined by diﬀerences in factor endowments and not by
environmental policy. According to the factor endowment hypothesis, capital
abundant countries will export capital intensive (dirty) goods since most pollut-
ing industries are also highly capital intensive (see, e.g., Antweiler et al., 2001;
Mani & Wheeler, 1997), and therefore, capital abundant countries will experi-
ence an increase in pollution. Countries, where capital is scarce, will see a fall in
pollution given the contraction of the pollution-generating industries. Since
higher income countries are more capital abundant than lower income countries,
in the presence of trade liberalization, developed countries will specialize in
capital-intensive, dirty industries, and developing countries will specialize in
labor-intensive, relatively cleaner industries. This is opposite of what the PHH
predicts, and thus, the actual impact of liberalized trade on the environment
depends on the determinants of comparative advantages across countries.
Studies by Antweiler et al. (2001) and Cole and Elliott (2003), using diﬀerent
measures of pollution, ﬁnd evidence that both environmental regulations and
relative capital-labor endowments determine the composition eﬀect of free trade
on the environment. After accounting for the scale, technique, and the compos-
ition eﬀects, Antweiler et al. (2001) concluded that free trade is good for the
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environment. Cole and Elliott (2003) conﬁrmed this overall claim only for some
pollutants and only for pollution intensities data but not for the emissions data.
The race to the bottom is the third hypothesis, which asserts that developed
countries refrain from adopting more stringent environmental regulations due to
competition with countries that have lax environmental regulation (Esty &
Geradin, 1998; Stoessel, 2001).
Finally, the ‘‘Porter hypothesis’’ assumes a race to the top, meaning that strict
environmental regulations have the potential to reduce costs and induce eﬃcient
use of resources while encouraging innovation that helps to improve competi-
tiveness (Porter & van der Linde, 1995; Stoessel, 2001). The hypothesis predicts
that tightening of environmental regulation will have positive eﬀects on the
economy and the environment. Ambec and Barla (2006) followed the same
line of thinking and argue that environmental regulations force managers to
adopt proﬁtable technologies earlier. While the ‘‘weak’’ version of the hypoth-
esis states that stricter regulation leads to more innovation, the ‘‘strong’’ version
states that stricter regulation enhances business performance. The empirical tests
of the Porter hypothesis are mainly based on speciﬁc industries with certain
characteristics that proﬁt the most from stringent regulations. For example,
Albrecht (1998) analyzed only industries aﬀected by the Montreal Protocol
and ﬁnds evidence supporting the Porter hypothesis for Denmark and the
United States, whereas Murty and Kumar (2003) focused their analyses on
water-polluting industries in India and also ﬁnd weak support for the hypoth-
esis. Ambec, Cohen, Elgie, and Lanoie (2011) provided a summary of theoretical
and empirical studies on the Porter hypothesis. On the empirical side, the evi-
dence for the weak version of the Porter hypothesis is fairly well established,
while the empirical evidence on the strong version is mixed, with only recent
studies supporting it. Most studies use productivity as the target variable with
the exception of Constantini and Crespi (2008), who use exports of speciﬁc
industries related to renewable energies and ﬁnd support for the strong version
of the hypothesis.
In summary, the literature identiﬁes the existence of both positive and negative
eﬀects of pollution policy on trade and the environment. The positive eﬀects include
increased growth accompanied by the distribution of environmentally safe, high-
quality goods, services, and technology. The negative eﬀects stem from the reloca-
tion of pollution-intensive economic activities to countries with lax environmental
regulations that could potentially threaten the regenerative capabilities of ecosys-
tems while increasing the danger of depletion of natural resources.
The gravity model of trade has often been used as a theoretical framework to
empirically analyze the relationship between environmental regulations and
trade ﬂows and, in particular, to test for the existence of a PHH. Related
research contributions are due to Harris, Ko´nya, and Ma´tya´s (2002); Grether
and de Melo (2003); van Beers and van den Bergh (1997); and Jug and Mirza
(2005), who tested for the existence of a PHH using panel data and focus mainly
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on developed countries. The results are not unambiguous and produce, at
best, weak evidence in favor of the PHH. This is conﬁrmed by a meta-
analysis provided by Mulatu, Florax, and Withagen (2004). Of all these
studies, only Jug and Mirza’s (2005) empirical application was based on a
structural gravity equation that is well theoretically founded. The authors
also summarize the main ﬁndings of previous studies investigating the
impact of environmental regulations on trade using sectoral data (Table 1,
p. 5). Jug and Mirza (2005) concluded that none of the studies using the
gravity model of trade ﬁnds a robust link between environmental standards
and trade and that studies focusing on the United States claim that endo-
geneity is the main reason why previous studies did not ﬁnd an eﬀect.
We have chosen to use the gravity model in this article because it is a well-
established trade model with solid theoretical foundations. It also permits the
tackling of the aforementioned econometric problems of endogeneity, unobserv-
able heterogeneity, and aggregation issues. To investigate the presence of pollu-
tion haven on the European continent, we follow Levinson and Taylor (2008)
and control for unobserved characteristics of industries and locations and con-
sider that pollution regulation and trade may be endogenous to each other.
Theoretical Background, Model Specification, Data,
and Variables
Theoretical Background and Model Specification
The gravity model of trade is nowadays the most commonly accepted frame-
work to model bilateral trade ﬂows (Anderson, 1979; Anderson & Van
Wincoop, 2003; Bergstrand, 1985).
Table 1. Summary Statistics.
EU¼ 0 EU¼ 1
Variable Obs Mean SD Obs Mean SD Test-diff
Dirty exports
(in millions)
21,089 13.8 57.5 59,255 103 356 36.26
Clean exports
(in millions)
22,992 804 1650 61,582 5790 10600 70.79
Total environmental
tax revenues
22,992 8521.26 14002.81 61,582 15959.91 17183.91 58.76
GDP 22,992 325654.1 548955.5 61,582 629149.7 710729.1 58.56
Note. Test difference reports t statistics for the difference in means. See Table A3 for variable descriptions.
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Independent from the theoretical framework of reference, most of the main-
stream foundations of the gravity model are variants of the Anderson (1979)
demand-driven model, which assumes a constant elasticity of substitution and
product diﬀerentiation by origin. According to the underlying theory, trade
between two countries is explained by nominal incomes, by the distance between
the economic centers of the exporter and importer and by trade costs usually
proxied with a number of trade impeding and trade facilitating variables, such as
trade agreements, common language, or a common border.
According to the underlying theory that has been reformulated and extended
by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), the model assumes a constant elasticity
of substitution and product diﬀerentiation by place of origin. In addition, prices
diﬀer among locations due to symmetric bilateral trade costs. The reduced form
of the model is given by
Xijkt ¼ YitYjt
YWt
tijt
PitPjt
 1s
, ð1Þ
where Xijkt are bilateral exports of product k from country i to country j in year t,
and Yit, Yjt, and Y
W
t are the gross domestic products (GDPs) in the exporting
country, the importing country, and the world in year t, respectively. tijt denotes
trade cost between the exporter and the importer in year t, andPit andPjt are the so-
calledmultilateral resistance terms. is the elasticity of substitution between goods.
The empirical speciﬁcation of the model in Equation 1 in log-linear form is
given by
lnXijkt ¼ lnYit þ lnYjt  lnYWt þ 1 sð Þln tijt þ 1 sð ÞlnPit þ 1 sð ÞlnPjt:
ð2Þ
The estimation of Equation 2 is not straightforward, since some assumptions
are required, concerning the trade costs and multilateral resistance terms. The
trade cost function is assumed to be a linear function of a number of trade
barriers, namely, the time invariant determinants of trade ﬂows such as distance,
common border, common language, and whether a country is landlocked.
Substituting the trade cost function into Equation 2 suggests estimating
ln Xijkt
  ¼ 0 þ 1 lnYit þ 2 lnYjt þ 3 lnDij þ 4Landli þ 5Landlj
þ 6Borderij þ 7EUijt þ uijkt,
ð3Þ
where Dij denotes geographical distance from country i to country j; Landli and
Landj take the value of one when countries i or j are, respectively, landlocked, 0
otherwise; Borderij takes the value of one when the trading countries share a
border, 0 otherwise; and EUijt takes the value of one when the trading countries
are members of the EU, 0 otherwise. Based on the recent gravity literature,
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the multilateral resistance terms are modeled as country-pair-speciﬁc dummies.
That prevents us from obtaining the coeﬃcient estimates for time-invariant vari-
ables, and their eﬀects are subsumed into the country-pair dummies.
The gravity model has been widely used to investigate the role played by
speciﬁc policy or geographical variables in explaining bilateral trade ﬂows.
Consistent with this approach, and in order to investigate the eﬀect of environ-
mental regulations on exports, we augment the model with proxies for the dif-
ferences in environmental regulations between countries and use net exports as
the dependent variable. Introducing several sets of ﬁxed eﬀects, the speciﬁcation
of the gravity model is
ln netXijkt
  ¼ kt þ ij þ 1 lnYit þ 2 lnYjt þ 3 lnEtaxdifijt þ 4EUijt þ ijkt,
ð4Þ
NetXijkt is net exports of industry k from country i to country j at time t;
EUjit is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when countries i and j belong
to the EU, 0 otherwise;
Etaxdifijt denotes the diﬀerence in the environmental stringency calculated as the
diﬀerence between the total environmental tax revenues between countries i
and j (in current E);
Yit and Yjt denote the GDPs in the exporting country and the importing country
in year t in current E.
The dummy variable for the EU integration is time-varying since Eastern
European countries joined the EU at diﬀerent times during the period studied.
kt are speciﬁc industry-time eﬀects that control for omitted variables speciﬁc to
each industry export ﬂows but which vary over time. ij are bilateral-speciﬁc
ﬁxed eﬀects that proxy for multilateral resistance factors.
Although some authors suggest that exporter and importer ﬁxed eﬀects
should be time varying, we cannot include them in the estimation because
they are correlated with the variables of interest. Instead, we use industry-spe-
ciﬁc time-varying ﬁxed eﬀects to proxy for the dynamics of speciﬁc factors that
aﬀect sectoral competitiveness in all countries. We estimate the model by repla-
cing the time-invariant bilateral variables, such as distance and common border
with dyadic ﬁxed eﬀects to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Hence, the
inﬂuence of the variables that vary only with the ij dimension cannot be directly
estimated. This is the case for distance and common border; therefore, their
eﬀects are subsumed in the dyadic dummies.
The expected signs for the coeﬃcients of the variables included in the model
are based on the theory. A high level of income in the exporting country indi-
cates a high level of production, which increases the availability of goods for
export. Therefore, we expect 1 to be positive. The coeﬃcient on Yj, 2, is also
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expected to be positive, since a high level of income in the importing country
suggests a higher demand for imports.
The expected sign for the coeﬃcient on the environmental stringency diﬀer-
ence is also not unambiguous. According to the PHH, we expect the sign to be
negative. Stricter environmental standards will increase the cost of production
and result in higher prices of domestically produced goods relative to foreign
goods leading to a decrease in net exports. For dirty industries, the stringency of
environmental regulation will imply a loss of competitiveness and lower net
exports of dirty goods. However, the Porter hypothesis states that the sign on
the environmental stringency variable should be positive. According to Porter
and Van der Linde (1995), stringent environmental regulations can lead to a
development of comparative advantage in highly regulated industries. Other
reasons for a positive eﬀect include technology spillovers as well as consumer
demand for ‘‘green’’ goods in the trading partner countries.
We estimate the gravity model for ‘‘clean’’ trade ﬂows and for exports by
speciﬁc dirty industries for which the impact should be stronger, according to the
related literature. Following Low and Yeats (1992), Tobey (1990), van Beers and
Van der Bergh (1997), Xu (1999), Harris et al. (2002) and Arouri, Caporale,
Rault, Sova, and Sova (2012), we classiﬁed industries into dirty and footloose
categories based on the SITC (version 3). According to Low and Yeats, pollu-
tion-intensive industries are those for which incurred pollution abatement and
control costs are 1% or more of total costs. The following industries are clas-
siﬁed as ‘‘dirty’’ 51 (organic chemicals), 52 (inorganic chemicals), 59 (chemical
materials), 64 (paper, paperboard), 67 (iron and steel), 68 (nonferrous metals),
and 69 (metals manufactures), 251 (pulp and waste paper), 334 (petroleum prod-
ucts), 335 (residual petroleum products), 562 (fertilizers), 634 (veneers, ply-
wood), 635 (wood manufactures), 661 (lime, cement, construction materials).
Within the dirty category, industries 59, 67, 69, and 661 are classiﬁed as pollu-
tion intensive ‘‘footloose’’ industries because these sectors do not depend on
resources and can easily relocate. It is expected that if environmental regulations
have a real impact on international trade ﬂows, their impact should be the
strongest for exports by dirty industries and in particular for exports by ‘‘foot-
loose’’ industries. To be able to compare our ﬁndings to the studies cited earlier,
we followed the same classiﬁcation of footloose industries, noting that cement
may not be a footloose industry because of its high transport cost (see
Ederington et al., 2005). Table A1 presents the description of each industry
and the corresponding emissions intensities.
Data and Variables
We examine export ﬂows for a panel of 21 EU countries from 1999 to 2013, the
latest year for which complete data are available. Table A2 provides a list of
countries and the years when the Eastern European countries joined the EU.
10 Journal of Environment & Development 0(0)
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Data on total and sectoral bilateral trade ﬂows are from the UN COMTRADE.
GDPs at current prices are from Eurostat. Other gravity variables, such as
common border, common language, and distances come from CEPII, but they
are dropped from the ﬁnal model because they are time invariant.
For the environmental stringency variables, we use a new version of
Eurostat’s Environmental Expenditures and Environmental Taxes database.
Eurostat collects data through a Joint Eurostat and Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development questionnaire on Environmental
Protection Expenditure and Revenues. Data include all sectors of the economy
and allow for a temporal comparison among the EU countries. As the main
proxy for regulatory stringency, we use total environmental tax revenues. This
variable is comparable to that used by recent studies (Ben Kheder & Zugravu,
2012; Constantini & Crespi, 2008).
A major obstacle for empirical studies assessing the linkage between trade
and the environment is lack of direct measure of the stringency of environmental
regulation. According to Brunel and Levinson (2016), one challenge in measur-
ing the stringency of environmental regulation is the issue of multidimensional-
ity, which reﬂects that regulations diﬀer by medium, pollutant, sector, and the
nature of enforcement. The authors also mention the issue of simultaneity where
regulatory stringency is both inﬂuencing and inﬂuenced by the emissions of
pollutants. To tackle multidimensionality, most researchers considered a single
environmental policy variable, which makes their ﬁndings diﬃcult to generalize.
Simultaneity can be addressed using the instrumental variable techniques.
The types of measures used in the empirical literature to represent environ-
mental stringency have been either survey based or have focused on total
expenditures at a country level or at a sectoral level. Good examples of recent
studies that focus on survey indicators are Spatareanu (2007), Wagner and
Timmins (2009), Kellenberg (2009), Manderson and Kneller (2012), and
Rezza (2013) who used the Executive Opinion Survey published at the Global
Competitiveness Report, which surveys business executives on environmental
issues and measures the overall stringency of environmental regulations and
enforcement on a scale from 1 to 7. The advantage of this measure is that it
allows for a comparison of a broader number of countries outside the EU.
However, on the negative side, the construction of the indicators depends on
the perceptions of survey respondents, and survey questions have not been con-
sistent over the years, which make comparisons over time unfeasible.
Examples of proxies for environmental stringency based on expenditures
include public expenditures for environmental protection (Magnani, 2000;
Pearce & Palmer, 2001), pollution abatement control expenditures (Cole,
Elliott, & Shimamoto, 2005; Ederington & Minier, 2003; Levinson & Taylor,
2008; Marconi, 2012), or current environmental protection expenditures by
industry as a percentage of GDP (Constantini & Crespi, 2008; Jug & Mirza,
2005). A disadvantage of using public-sector expenditures is that their increase
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can potentially reduce investment by the private sector in protecting the envir-
onment, and it is not guaranteed that they will result in stricter regulations.
While the pollution abatement control expenditures directly reﬂect the expend-
itures on the protection of the environment by ﬁrms, their drawback is that they
include all abatement costs, which makes it diﬃcult to separate the abatement
costs due to regulatory stringency from all other abatement costs. Furthermore,
there may be incentives to overstate or understate the abatement costs by ﬁrms.
Current environmental protection expenditures cover spending on activities that
are directly aimed at the prevention, reduction, and elimination of pollution or
any other degradation of the environment and, as such, are a reasonable can-
didate for measuring the stringency of regulation. We have also considered this
variable, but the data are incomplete. Hence, we opted for the total environ-
mental tax revenues data provided by Eurostat because they are directly related
to the production processes, and the associated costs incurred by ﬁrms to abate
pollution. They also correspond to the common European environmental regu-
lation reﬂecting equal environmental standards for all EU members. Brunel and
Levinson (2016) cautioned that for the same level of regulatory stringency, the
control costs may vary due to diﬀerences in the costs of inputs to pollution
abatement, ﬁrm heterogeneity, the country’s geographic location, level of devel-
opment, market imperfections, or access to technology. Changes in environmen-
tal taxes must also be interpreted with caution. The increases may be caused by
the introduction of new taxes or an increase in tax rates, or alternatively may be
linked to an increase in the tax base. Any investment in pollution reduction
lowers taxes and ﬁrms beneﬁt from less scrutiny from the government.
Figure 1 shows the evolution over time of environmental tax revenues as a
share of GDP for the CEECs included in our sample. Some convergence toward
lower average values can be observed for the period under study.
Table 1 displays the summary statistics for the independent and dependent
variables for non-EU countries and EU groups of countries. The last column
shows the results of a test of the diﬀerences in the mean for each variable
between the two groups. These diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant for all
variables. In general, EU membership is associated with higher exports of
both dirty and clean goods and higher GDPs. Also, environmental tax shares
are signiﬁcantly higher for the EU members than for non-EU member states.
Table 2 displays the bivariate correlation coeﬃcients for the variables in our
study. Environmental stringency is negatively associated with the exports of
both dirty and clean products and with the GDP in the importing countries
but positively with the GDP of exporting countries.
Main Results
The ﬁrst estimation results based on Model 4 are reported in Table 3. Columns 1
and 2 show the results obtained for dirty exports and for footloose industries,
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column 3 for clean exports. Regarding our target variable, namely, exporters’
environmental tax revenue diﬀerence (Etaxdif), the results indicate a positive cor-
relation between the former variable and net exports for dirty and clean goods.
However, the coeﬃcient is only statistically signiﬁcant for clean exports. This
implies that stricter environmental regulations stimulate trade in clean goods.
The coeﬃcients on the exporter’s and importer’s incomes are positive and
signiﬁcant in most cases and diﬀerent from the theoretical value of unity.
The EU dummy for membership in the integration agreement is positive and
signiﬁcant, indicating that exports are higher for participating countries than for
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
1999  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
EU-15 Bulgaria Czech Republic Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia
Figure 1. Trend in total environmental tax revenues, percent of GDP.
Source. Author’s elaboration using data from Eurostat.
Table 2. Correlation Coefficients.
Ln(dirty exports) Ln(clean exports) Ln(GDPi) Ln(GDPj) EU
Ln(clean exports) 0.562
Ln(GDPi) 0.347 0.469
Ln(GDPj) 0.427 0.529 0.034
EU dummy 0.334 0.403 0.273 0.518
Ln(environmental
stringency)
0.109 0.097 0.638 0.771 0.228
Note. All correlations are statistically significant at the 1% level. EU is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a
country is a member of the European Union; 0 otherwise.
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the rest of the countries in the sample but only for dirty and footloose goods but
not for clean goods.
We obtain similar results when we use an instrumental variable estimator to
control for the endogeneity of the environmental variables as shown in columns
4 to 6 in Table 3. The instruments used are the lagged values of the variable of
interest (we also tried ﬁrst and second lag of total tax revenues and obtained
similar results). We ﬁrst assess the relevance and validity of our instruments.
Eﬀective instruments must satisfy two conditions: They must be correlated with
the included endogenous variables (relevant), and they must be orthogonal to
the error term (valid). Using the Sargan-Hansen statistic (for over identiﬁca-
tion), we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are jointly uncor-
related with the errors given p values of .692, .481, and .561, respectively. Using
a Conditional Likelihood Ratio test (for weak instruments), we fail to reject the
null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are correlated with the included
endogenous regressors given the p values of .469, .407, and .419, respectively.
Based on our assessment, the instruments are both relevant and valid.
The environmental stringency variable of interest has the same signiﬁcance
level, but the magnitude of the estimated coeﬃcient for the exporters’ environ-
mental tax expenditure diﬀerence is slightly higher for clean goods in compari-
son to the results in column 3 in Table 3. According to the results in column 6,
a 10% increase in environmental taxes is associated with a 13% increase in net
exports of clean goods.
To investigate whether the results diﬀer by industry and region and whether
this heterogeneity is the reason why we obtain nonsigniﬁcant coeﬃcients on the
environmental stringency variable, we run similar regressions for the EU-15
countries and the CEECs and for each dirty industry separately. Hence, we
run regressions with sector-speciﬁc slope coeﬃcients to see whether there is
heterogeneity within the dirty industries that is aﬀecting the estimated coeﬃ-
cients. Table 4 reports the estimation results for the environmental expenditure
diﬀerences variable. Again, we instrument for environmental stringency with
lagged values. The instruments are both relevant and valid. The results for
the relevance and the validity of instruments are reported in Tables A4 to
A6. We ﬁnd that for the EU-15 countries higher diﬀerences in environmental
revenues between partner countries are associated with lower net exports of
dirty goods for seven major polluter industries, namely, for chemical mater-
ials, paper and paperboard, metal manufactures, petroleum products, fertil-
izers, wood manufacturers, and lime, cement, and construction materials. This
happens only for two industries when the CEECs are considered as exporters
(fertilizers and wood manufacturers). The estimated coeﬃcient of the target
variable is not statistically signiﬁcant for other industries possibly because
these industries contain a range of products that are still too heterogeneous.
Summarizing, while higher diﬀerences in environmental tax revenues are posi-
tively correlated with clean exports, they are negatively correlated with exports
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of some dirty and footloose industries. Hence, we ﬁnd some evidence supporting
the Porter hypothesis for clean exports and only some evidence of the PHH for
speciﬁc footloose and dirty industries.
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
This article contributes to the debate of whether environmental regulations inﬂuence
patterns of international trade.We investigatewhether changes in the stringency of a
country’s environmental regulations result in pollution havens, in particular in rela-
tion to trade ﬂows within the European continent from 1999 to 2013, covering,
therefore, the recent accession of the CEECs into the EU and the subsequent
changes in the regulatory framework of new members. We empirically assess the
relationship between environmental stringency and export ﬂows by estimating a
gravity model of trade augmented with environmental tax revenue variables.
Using panel data and instrumental variables techniques, we ﬁnd that environ-
mental stringency variables are an important determinant of clean bilateral
exports and of speciﬁc dirty and footloose industries’ exports. More speciﬁcally,
while exporters’ environmental tax revenue diﬀerences are positively correlated
with bilateral net exports of clean industries, the eﬀect of environmental strin-
gency diﬀerences on net exports of dirty industries is not signiﬁcant when all the
industries are treated as a homogeneous group. The results are robust to a variety
of speciﬁcations for the particular variables used in the estimation, namely, to the
use of diﬀerent type of ﬁxed eﬀects to control for unobserved heterogeneity.
However, when heterogeneity across speciﬁc industries and between two groups
of countries is considered, the results diﬀer. We ﬁnd that for the EU-15 countries
higher diﬀerences in environmental revenues between partner countries are asso-
ciated with lower net exports of dirty goods for seven major polluter industries,
namely for chemical materials, paper and paperboard, metal manufactures, petrol-
eum products, fertilizers, wood manufacturers, and lime, cement, and construction
materials. However, when the CEECs are considered as exporters, the same phe-
nomenon happens for two industries only (fertilizers and wood manufacturers).
Summarizing, the empirical results show that for Western EU countries, more
stringent regulations could foster comparative advantages at the international
level for clean exports, and these ﬁndings could be interpreted as supporting
evidence for the Porter hypothesis. Additionally, for exports of some goods
belonging to dirty and footloose industries, we ﬁnd some evidence of a PHE.
An important policy implication of our ﬁndings is that the diﬀerential in
environmental stringency between exporting and importing countries is a sig-
niﬁcant factor in explaining the changes in trade patterns between countries.
Stricter environmental regulations have the potential to enhance the distribution
of environmentally safe, high-quality goods, services, and technology, thus low-
ering the pollution levels, reducing the depletion of natural resources, and
improving health outcomes. Western countries should take the lead and
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spread the knowledge to developing countries. There are positive spillovers from
investing in environmentally safe production that extend beyond the borders of
a single country. In a related study, in an eﬀort to reduce the greenhouse gas
emissions, Gurtu, Searcy, and Jaber (2016) proposed a carbon tax based on the
diﬀerence between emission rates of the importing and exporting countries since
importing countries do not normally account for the emissions associated with
the good they import. Therefore, they propose that countries adopt a carbon
tax, as a national policy, on outsourced emissions. If adopted, this tax would be
reﬂected in the total environmental tax revenue data used in our study. Adopting
such a tax would prevent the relocation of pollution-intensive economic activ-
ities to countries with lax environmental regulations and prevent pollution
havens from developing. To protect the integrity of the environment, necessary
measures have to be taken domestically and internationally.
While our ﬁndings may apply only to the sample of countries studied, further
research could be extended to include other countries that joined the EU beyond
the original EU-15. Further analyses employing industry-speciﬁc measures of
environmental stringency could shed additional light on the relationship
between the environmental regulation and the trade patterns.
Appendix
Table A1. List of Industries and Classification.
Code Description Classification Emissions intensity
SITC 251 Pulp and waste paper Dirty 0.608
SITC 334 Petroleum products Dirty 1.210
SITC 335 Residual petroleum products Dirty 2.743
SITC 51 Organic chemicals Dirty 0.967
SITC 52 Inorganic chemicals Dirty 2.331
SITC 562 Fertilizers Dirty 3.530
SITC 59 Chemical materials Footloose 1.019
SITC 634 Veneers, plywood Dirty 0.121
SITC 635 Wood manufactures Dirty 0.121
SITC 64 Paper, paperboard Dirty 0.608
SITC 661 Lime, cement, construction materials Footloose 12.01
SITC 67 Iron and steel Footloose 1.054
SITC 68 Non-ferrous metals Dirty 1.613
SITC 69 Metals manufactures Footloose 0.188
Source. Classification from Harris et al. (2002). Emissions intensity is from ESA (2010). It is measured as
metric tons of CO2 per $1,000 in constant $2,000. Also see http://www.esa.doc.gov/sites/default/files/
reports/documents/co2reportfinal.pdf.
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Table A2. List of Countries.
Country name Year of accession
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria 2007
Czech Republic 2004
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary 2004
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Poland 2004
Portugal
Romania 2007
Slovakia 2004
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
Source. Author’s elaboration.
Table A3. Definition of Variables and Sources.
Variable Definition of variables Source
NetXijkt Net exports of industry k from country i to country j at
time t
Eurostat
Yi Country i Gross Domestic Product in current E Eurostat
Yj Country j Gross Domestic Product in current E Eurostat
Etaxdifij Difference between the total environmental tax rev-
enues between countries i and j in current E
Eurostat
EU Dummy that takes the value of 1 when countries i and j
are EU members
World Trade Organization
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Notes
1. A few recent studies that found statistically significant PHE are Kellenberg (2009),
Wagner and Timmins (2009), Levinson and Taylor (2008), and Ederington and Minier
(2003). Jaffe et al. (1995) survey the earlier literature while Copeland and Taylor (2004)
and Brunnermeier and Levinson (2004) present widely cited review of the relatively
recent studies.
2. Footloose industries are industries that use very few raw materials and face low trans-
portation costs since they do not have to locate near the sources of raw materials.
Therefore, they can be easily moved from one country to another. Examples include
high-tech industries such as computing.
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